Whether there was an intervention before and/or widespread fraud during the tenth presidential election or whether it was a free and fair election, the political events which occurred after the announcement of the election results have changed both the pre-election political condition and the organisational setting in the Islamic Republic of Iran. A return to the pre-election period for the Iranian political authority is surely no longer possible. The consequences of this crisis in coming months will eventually lead to acceleration of reform in the institution of leadership.
From the early days of revolution onwards the political authority in Iran has claimed, in theory and practice, that power and the political power in this Islamic regime has a divine source. The governing elite as the results are “Allah’s representative on Earth” who should control and execute the power. The political authority advocates that in order to expand the divine version of power the objective of the Islamic government in Iran is to abolish this-worldly nature of power. Conversely, thousands of writers and observers in last thirty years have highlighted the fact that the power in the Islamic Republic was nothing more than the rule of various Pan-Islamist groups from high-ranking members of the clerical establishment, high-ranking members of military and paramilitary groups, bureaucrats and technocrat groups. In other words, while the claim to have a divine root remained to be proven, in the public opinion the Islamic government was no more than the rule of wealthy Pan-Islamist groups and individual elites. The post-election street protest was the brilliant public initial to confront the Islamic elite and exhibit the reality that they are a government of those who had neither a theoretical nor a practical chastity and who are obliged to recognize the ‘this-worldly’ social events, and finally be infected by the change and modernization. The despotic nature of conservative political elite however had brutally contrasted the political reform and changes.
The brutal response to street protestors in recent political events consequently effaces the Islamic republic divine image that has built its regime upon in the public eyes and ended the illusion of legitimacy that has built upon its divinely oriented power and political power. For the Iranian society recent events was the highlight of the fact that the Islamic regime’s religious make-up and divine dressing of the last thirty years was nothing more than a protective shield and that the Iranian political authority is a this-worldly political phenomenon with particular despotic structure of power and nothing else. In other words, it become obvious to every individuals that what has happened in the post-election period was related clearly to the last thirty years methods of Islamic governing model and at the same time reflects the struggles of oppositional groups for reform in the structure of power and political power. The protesters show this is the same power as described in modern philosophical concepts and political sciences, as a this-worldly phenomenon implemented by this-worldly human beings and distinct from divinity.
To understand the post-election political setting and the governing organisation in Iran we shall first review the intervention of political groups in recent events and highlight the process of ‘submission, replacement, and neutralisation’ of the executive and juridical branches of the government in last four years. To trace the above process an explanation about the political equation between the two camps of the reformers and conservatives, the process of leadership reform that started in 1997, the changes in the concept and practice of power and political power, the political relationship in the IRI among inter-state groups, and the perspective on the modernisation in coming years, are necessary.
Since the presidential election in 1997 and the Tehran universities incident in 1999, the debate on the reform of the leadership has been on-going. The reform on politics during these years in the IRI showed that in the case of a political crisis, two organs of the government (the Guardian Council and the juridical branch) - amongst other institutions – will suffer the most negative consequences. Since the political reform in 1997 began, these two organs, under the guidance of the Supreme Leader, have had the critical role of creating the political and juridical impasses on the path for change and modernisation. On the other hand, during these years (1997-2005) other organs, such as those under the Executive branch and Parliament (especially during the sixth parliament), and the Expediency Council, played an important role in the political events and institutional changes. Since 2005 and the conservatives’ victory in the presidential election, this situation partly changed track and fluctuated, but the main process remained untouched. In other words the method for introducing the power and the juridical impositions and customs did not fundamentally change, although the political authority of the time reduced the effectiveness of some of the governing organs and sub-organs, or just dissolved them. For instance, organs such as the central bank were weakened with the frequent changes of the head of management. The governmental higher council and organisation of budget and planning was dissolved with the order of the new president. But at the same time the state policy of interventionism helped to limit the social pressure on the Guardian Council and the Supreme Leader. Then the popular criticism against juridical power was reduced; nevertheless, the sharpest criticism was concentrated and directed towards political authority.
After the tenth presidential election in June 2009 a new phase in the process of transformation in the IRI began, particularly in the juridical institution. First, the elected conservative political authority during its first four years of power (2005-2009), with the repressive policies of its executive power, had embraced and produced public distrust. This widely-held opinion lead to action once the government was accused of fraud, and as a result, the regime as a whole lost credibility or any legitimate power in regaining the public trust. Second, the institution of religious Jurisprudence also lost its legitimacy after the Supreme Leader’s speech during prayers on the first Friday after the election, and was in the eyes of the public “demoted” from a legitimate leadership institution to being only a conservative political faction. Moreover, the Supreme Leaser’s call for the removal of newly appointed vice-president Rahim Mashaie (who has publicly called the Israelis friends of the Iranians) was another fatal stroke for the organ of the leadership. Third, the Guardian Council lost its credibility amongst the conservatives when two reformers were allowed to become official candidates standing for presidential election and call for fundamental changes. On the other hand, Guardian Council lost its credibility amongst the reformers when it recognised the result of the election. Moreover, in the eyes of the public, Guardian Council was no longer seen as a non-partisan governing organ, rather as a political group belonging to a conservative faction because it had stood for and supported that conservative faction. Fourth, adding to this, both the juridical power and the state monopolised media totally lost their credibility and became isolated in the public opinion because of their support of the conservative political authority during the street protests and especially because of their support of the reformers’ political trials and accusations of a “velvet coup”. Fifth, the police forces, the Islamic guard corps, and the paramilitary militia, all by killing the protesters and using violent and excessive forces, were accused of criminal behaviour; moreover, once the police hooliganism in the streets of Tehran were broadcast internationally, their credibility was extremely damaged. But next to these process and events was another parallel process through which three key controlling organs of the regime lost their credibility to a large extent. These three important organs are the Expediency Council, the Assembly of Experts and the Parliament.
First, as time passed, and as the political crisis expanded to reach other state institutions, Abdullah Nouri (former minister of Home Affairs under the president Khatami) proposed that the Expediency Council pronounce the final result of the election. But the Speaker of State stipulated that the government was not willing to give such an important decision to the Expediency Council. This position and the previous accusation of the Head of State against the head of the Expediency Council and the position of the Supreme Leader to remain silent, all together shows that this canonical organ of the regime had lost its political importance and was excluded from all decision making. Second, at the same time after the election and at the start of the political conflict, several elites and political groups directly or indirectly requested from the Assembly of the Experts to review the competence of the Supreme Leader. With regards to the balance of power and the conservatism of the members of the Assembly of Experts, this request was rejected and the Assembly of Experts, despite its important role and constitutional position, became a speculative and powerless organ. Third, among all political and governmental organs recited in the constitution, it was only the Parliament which remained intact. This was due to the recognition of its role and places in the IRI, and due to the cleverness of Ali Larijani the Speaker of House. The Parliament from the early days of the post-election conflict has intervened and assigned a parliamentary group to investigate police brutality and the torture and assassination in prisons during this period. The members of parliament mostly publicly criticised the political authority when the new president introduced his cabinet and ministers. This critical behaviour continued until the session in which there was a vote of confidence held, after which they mostly reacted harshly. Some observers suggested that a few of the candidates will be able to receive necessary support. However, although the Parliament best resisted the process of submissiveness, nonetheless, it was finally obliged to support 18 of the 21 candidates and reject three, two of whom were women. In this given situation, safeguarding its juridical position and political legitimacy was the only choice the Parliament has left to negate all responsibilities and make the public understand that it was obliged to approve the proposed candidates. A member of the conservative faction mentioned in his speech that the Parliament, similar to other governing organs in the IRI, was no longer capable of protecting its constitutional position and became an instrument for implementing the Supreme Leader’s orders.
As stated earlier in this report, this paper does not evaluate the reformers’ accusation of fraud or the conservatives’ claim of fairness in the presidential election. Rather, the objective is to understand the submissiveness process that the political and juridical organs of the IRI in the post-election period have undergone. As stated above, the most important organs and the governing institutions of the IRI either lost legitimacy or were submitted to various military or paramilitary organs over a short period of time. As a result, most juridical or political channels in the government have somehow been blocked and all of the involved constitutional organs that confronted the post-election crisis have been broken apart. In other words, the most influential governing organs have either lost popularity or become outcast very quickly. The effect of this situation has had a serious impact not only on other governing organs but also on non-governmental organisations as well. Among these, for instance, are the religious establishment and the founding personalities of the IRI, who have also not been immune to oppression and accusations.
The importance of the presence of millions of protesters in the streets of major cities all over Iran should not be underestimated. Their qualitative demands for changes and quantitative numbers representing various sectors of society were new to the thirty-year-old Islamic Republic rule in contemporary Iran. At the same time referring to popular protest and demonstration as the only instrument for bringing about change in the IRI is not promising. Rather, in addition to the effects of the post-election protests, the internal power struggle that demolished and excluded some of the governing institutions is an important factor. Therefore, the next question will be how the process of change in the political organs and the juridical structure has taken place and as a result, what are the future consequences?
To answer this question, we shall first examine how the change in the juridical structure has come about. From the later years of the ex-president Khatami’s second term, the process of restoration of the political organs become transparent in three respects.
The first was the process of structural submission: a process in which all juridical capacity of the appointed organs was used to increasingly control elected organs like the Parliament and other organs of the executive branch. In this process and in the course of time, these organs become a subset of the military hierarchy and their constitutive foundation and reason d'être was contested. This process took place particularly in other half-elected and half appointed organs such as the Guardian Council, and the juridical structure. According to some sources, the peak of this process in post-election weeks was the control of state radio and television to the extent that the text for Friday’s clerical prayer speech was also written by members of the high-ranking military hierarchy.
The second was the process of replacement: control of the elected organs with the help of the right-wing individuals and allied political groups and the removal and replacement of individuals in these organs. In a tactical and temporary alliance with the right-wing elite, conservative members of the parliament and the executive branch, high-ranking members of the military or the neutral and obedient individuals took over the elected organs. In the early days after the election, the right-wing individuals received their share of power and wealth; however, once the competing reformer groups were totally eliminated, they lost their share.
The third process was the neutralisation of some governing organs and juridical structures, which based on the constitution, the clergymen groups were assigned to control. These organs, through the process of submission and then replacement, gradually were neutralised. For instance, amongst others, the Expediency Council and the Assembly of the Experts are the most important.
In this way the IRI political authority’s organisations and juridical institution have changed in recent years. This transformation took place through a political alliance of the military and paramilitary factions, conservative clerical groups and the traditional right-wing groups.
The opposition movement during and after the presidential election, among other things was against this process as well and millions of protesters occupied the streets of the major cities to show this opposition. The gathering of the social groups against the conservative government took a confrontational form, and as a result, the above process of transformation has totally changed into another, new track, which one might say has brought a fundamental decline and destructive process in the IRI. On the one hand, the appointed organs such as the Guardian Council, the juridical branch, and the Supreme Leader have come under a sharp criticism and destructive protest. On the other hand, the political authority was no longer willing to use the organs which were previously neutralised, such as the Expediency Council and the Assembly of Experts, to intervene and share their power to solve the problems in hand. In fact the destructive pressure of the political crisis and the protesters were directed against the Supreme Leader and other appointed organs under his control. Moreover, in this critical situation when the parliament was trying through the expedience of Ali Larijani and some other right-wing members to help monitor and control the crisis and to play a more important role, they were prevented from doing so by the Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader’s policy of prevention possibly came about due to consultation with and advice of the high-ranking military experts. Because the military and paramilitary groups desire to safeguard their interests and positions in the political authority, they oppose all forms of political solutions to this conflict. In fact, there is evidence showing that the interference of the military and paramilitary has ensured the position of the security and vigilance groups in the domain of politics and civilian spheres, and has accelerated the isolation or elimination of the civilian elite and political activists through the process of leadership reform. The office of leadership after the election tried to solve all contradictions and ideological differences through the military action, imprisonment and elimination of the opposition. Nonetheless, the ideological conflicts and interests inherent in the Islamic Republic political system have in this period intensified the process of leadership reform. In this way after the political elimination of the mainstream factions of reformers from political life, it seems with the continuation of the presence of the military in the domain of politics, the total destruction of the elected organs, and the acceleration of the process of the leadership reform in coming months the question to radical factions of reformers is if they will recognize this new political order or will decide to move radically towards regime change.
